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The stress that does not reset on 1 January 2026

The date changes. The load on balance sheets and infrastructure does not.

1/2/20265 min read

The stress that matters in 2026 is not a calendar event. It is the accumulation of capital, infrastructure, and demand pressures that do not reset when the clock rolls over to 1 January. Global forecasts show growth continuing, but at a slower, more fragile pace, with risks tilted to the downside rather than cleared.​

A world that looks stable from far away

Major institutions still project the global economy to grow around 3.1 % in 2026, a figure that signals resilience rather than collapse.​
From a distance this looks like normality: no systemic crisis, inflation moderating, and consumption holding up.

Look closer and the same outlooks describe an economy running below its pre pandemic pace, constrained by debt, weak productivity, and trade fragmentation.​
The system is not breaking, but it is operating with less slack, less policy space, and more embedded vulnerability.

Debt that rolls, not disappears

Global debt is now estimated at roughly 235 % of world GDP, higher than before the pandemic and still climbing.​
Large sovereigns face significant bond maturities into 2026, forcing them to refinance into rate environments that are tighter than the decade they just left.​

Commercial real estate is a visible case where this stress is crystallizing rather than resetting.
Analysts expect over 1.5 trillion dollars of commercial real estate loans to mature by the end of 2026, with office assets under the most pressure as vacancy rates hover near 20 % in many markets and delinquency rates on office CMBS have hit record highs.​

Refinancing stress is not only a real estate story.
Every borrower rolling debt over the next two years is effectively repricing decisions that were made in a world of near zero rates, and that repricing does not care that it is 2026 rather than 2025.

Grids, queues, and a transition stuck in line

Energy transition narratives often focus on headline capacity additions and investment totals.
The more important number for 2026 is the amount of renewable and storage capacity waiting to connect to grids that are not ready.

Studies of U.S. interconnection queues show nearly 2,600 gigawatts of generation and storage projects seeking grid access, more than double the size of the existing power plant fleet.​
Historically, only about 14 to 19 % of queued capacity has actually reached commercial operation, and average interconnection timelines have stretched from under two years to more than four.​

Those delays are not just a technical inconvenience.
They create a structural gap between announced decarbonization targets and what grids can deliver, and that gap widens every time new capacity is announced faster than transmission can be built.​

The stress here does not reset with new climate commitments each January.
It compounds, as more projects pile into queues, interconnection studies fall further behind, and capital is locked in assets that cannot produce revenue until the grid catches up.

Office markets that do not “reopen” on schedule

The assumption that office demand would normalize a few years after the pandemic has not held.​
In 2025, national U.S. office vacancy hovered in the high teens to low twenties, well above pre pandemic levels, and is expected to remain elevated into 2026.​

At the same time, delinquency rates for office backed CMBS reached nearly 12 % at the end of 2025, the highest since the global financial crisis.​
A wall of loan maturities will continue to hit older, less competitive buildings as leases signed before 2020 finally roll, forcing restructurings, discounted sales, or hand backs of keys.​

This is a slow moving stress, not a single event.
Every quarter that demand fails to recover is another quarter where capitalization assumptions made years ago are proven wrong, but the debt schedule keeps moving forward.

Trade, tariffs, and a more expensive status quo

Geopolitics adds another layer that does not obey calendar boundaries.
Tariff measures and trade tensions have reshaped global flows, raising costs for import dependent economies and injecting uncertainty into investment decisions.​

Reports note that higher tariffs and slower trade growth are now baked into baseline forecasts, not treated as temporary disruptions.​
For companies whose supply chains, pricing power, or market access depended on the previous era of globalization, 1 January 2026 is not a return to normal.

Instead, it marks one more year in which adjustment has to occur under more fragmented, politically influenced trade conditions.
Working capital, inventory strategies, and location decisions are now being made in an environment where the rules are less stable and more regionally specific than they were a decade ago.

The infrastructure of stress

A pattern runs through these examples.
Debt maturities, grid queues, and office vacancies are not isolated headlines, they are infrastructure level constraints that sit underneath board agendas across sectors.

  • Real estate and finance carry the refinancing wall.

  • Renewables and utilities run into transmission capacity limits.

  • Automotive, logistics, and manufacturing face power availability, tariffs, and supply chain realignment.

  • Recycling and waste systems lag the material flows that new technologies generate, leaving regulatory and reputational exposure unaddressed.​

Global outlooks describe 2026 as a year of “resilient but slower” growth.​
From an operator’s perspective, that translates into a world where the system broadly holds together, but the margin for misallocation shrinks and the penalty for ignoring underlying stress rises.

What this means for boards and capital

For boards, the key shift is recognizing that many 2026 decisions are being made on top of stresses that were already visible in 2024 and 2025 but not fully priced into plans.
The refinancing wall in commercial real estate, the backlog in grid connections, and the persistence of high vacancy in offices were all signaled well before 2026 – they have simply moved further into the foreground.​

The question is not whether stress exists but how it is distributed across balance sheets and time.
Some organizations will attempt to spread that stress thinly across many projects, hoping that gradual improvement or rate cuts will ease the pressure.

Others will treat stress as a constraint that forces choice.
They will re rank portfolios based on which assets and initiatives can clear higher financing costs, survive infrastructure bottlenecks, or operate under structurally different demand patterns.

In that world, a plan that assumes a clean slate every January is a liability.
What matters is the ability to track cumulative pressure on capital, infrastructure, and demand, and to decide explicitly which parts of the portfolio are allowed to absorb that pressure and which are not.

The stress that defines strategy

The stress that does not reset on 1 January 2026 is not a single crisis.
It is the operating environment: higher and more persistent debt loads, slower but still positive growth, infrastructure that lags ambition, and markets that are being reshaped by policy rather than merely by price.​

For leadership teams, the implication is clear.
Strategy for 2026 and beyond cannot be built on the assumption that yesterday’s imbalances will quietly fade with time; they are, in many cases, the new baseline.

The organizations that do best in this environment will be the ones that treat stress as a design parameter rather than a surprise, building portfolios, capital plans, and execution systems that assume these pressures persist longer than most forecasts are willing to admit.